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1. Introduction
The term biometrics refers to “automated recognition of individuals based on their
behavioral and biological characteristics” (ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37). Several physiological (static)
as well as behavioral (non-static) biometric characteristics have been exploited [1] such as
fingerprints, iris, face, hand, voice, gait, keystroke dynamics, etc., depending on distinct types
of applications (see Figure 1). Biometric traits are acquired applying adequate sensors and
distinctive feature extractors are utilized in order to generate a biometric template (reference
data) in the enrollment process. During verification (authentication process) or identification
(identification can be handled as a sequence of biometric comparisons against the enrollment
records in a reference databse) the system processes another biometric measurement from
which an according template is extracted and compared against the stored template(s)
yielding acceptance/ rejection or hit/ no-hit, respectively.
The presented work is motivated by very recent advances in the fields of multi-biometric
recognition [2] and biometric template protection [3]. Automatic recognition systems based
on a single biometric indicator often have to contend with unacceptable error rates [4].
Multi-biometric systems have improved the accuracy and reliability of biometric systems [2].
Biometric vendors are already deploying multi-biometric systems (e.g. fingerprint and finger
vein by SAFRAN Morpho1) and multi-biometric recognition is performed on large-scale
datasets (e.g. within the Aadhaar project [5] by the Unique Identification Authority of
India (UIDAI)). However, security of multi-biometric templates is especially crucial as they
contain information regarding multiple traits of the same subject [6]. The leakage of any
kind of template information to unauthorized individuals constitutes serious security and
privacy risks, e.g. permanent tracking of subjects without consent [7] or reconstruction of
original biometric traits (e.g. fingerprints [8] or iris textures [9]) might become a realistic
threat. Therefore, biometric template protection technologies have been developed in order
to protect privacy and integrity of stored biometric data. However, so far, template protection
schemes which provide provable security/ privacy, and achieve practical recognition rates
1 SAFRAN Morpho, France, http://www.morpho.com/
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Figure 1. Examples of physiological (static) biometric characteristics.
have remained elusive, even on small datasets. This bookchapter provides a comprehensive
overview of biometric fusion, biometric template protection, and, in particular, possible ways
of how to combine these technologies.
The remainder of this bookchapter is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly summarizes
advantages and issues of multi-biometric recognition. Template protection technologies
are reviewed in Section 3. In Section 4 multi-biometrics and template protection are
combined and related works are summarized. Subsequently, a theoretical framework for
multi-biometric template protection is introduced and major issues and challenges evolving
from incorporating biometric fusion to template protection technologies are discussed in
detail in Section 5. Finally, a summary is given in Section 6.
2. Multi-biometric recognition
Whenever biometric verification systems based on single biometric indicators have to deal
with noisy sensor acquisition, restricted degrees-of-freedom, or non-universality unpractical
performance rates are yielded [4]. Such drawbacks, which represent common scenarios when
operating biometric recognition systems, raise the need for multi-biometric recognition [2]
or other approaches that can increase the recognition accuracy. As previously mentioned,
a fusion of multiple biometric indicators have been shown to improved the accuracy and
reliability of biometric systems.
2.1. Categorization
Fusion in biometric systems is commonly categorized according to the level within which
the fusion is performed. ISO/IEC TR 24722:2007 coarsely distinguishes three possible levels
of fusion: (1) fusion at feature level, (2) fusion at score level, and (3) fusion at decision level.
Figure 2 illustrates these different types of biometric fusion.
1. Feature Level Fusion: biometric fusion on feature level comprises the construction of a new
feature vector of higher dimensionality composed of (a selection of) feature elements of
various feature vectors generated a priori. The new feature vector should turn out to be
more discriminative than each single one [4].
2. Score Level Fusion: on this level of fusion matching scores are returned by each individual
subsystem and obtained scores are combined. Once scores are properly normalized they
can be combined in different ways (e.g. by weighted sum-rule) such that the fusion of
normalized scores leads to a more accurate overall system.
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Figure 2. Biometric fusion: different levels of fusion within a biometric recognition system.
3. Decision Level Fusion: a fusion of final decisions (in general accept/ reject) is referred to as
decision level fusion. Various final decisions of independent subsystems can be fused (e.g.
by applying a majority voting) in order to increase the accuracy (security) or universality
(convenience) of the entire system [2].
2.2. Advantages
Multi-biometric recognition systems offer several advantages compared to conventional
biometric systems. There is a common and intuitive assumption that the combination
of multiple biometrics improves performance as multiple multiple sources of information
are involved. By combining multiple sources of information, it is possible to improve
systems biometric performance, increase population coverage, deter spoofing, and facilitate
indexing [10]. While several fusion levels are possible in multi-biometric systems (see
Chapter 2.1), biometric fusion on the score level represents the most popular one due to
the ease in accessing and consolidating comparison scores. Performance gain is achieved in
case uncorrelated traits are applied in a multi-biometric recognition systems. Incorporating
subject-specific parameters may further increase accuracy of these systems.
However, in case a strong (highly discriminative) biometric characteristic is combined with
a weak one, the resulting decision environment is in a sense averaged, and the combined
performance will lie somewhere between that of the two tests conducted individually. Hence,
biometric fusion is not straight forward, but highly depends on the choice of characteristics,
features, fusion type, etc.
2.3. Issues
Besides common issues like requirements for stronger user incorporation of feature level
fusion of different feature representations, one major issue regarding multi-biometric
recognition we want to emphasize on is the central storage of multiple biometric templates
of a single subject. Compared to conventional biometric systems based on a single biometric
indicator, multiple sources of information, i.e. more biometric reference data, has to be stored
for each subject registered with a multi-biometric system. In a multi-biometric system the
overall complexity increases as multiple SDK need to be maintained and the use of multiple
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Figure 3. Biometric template protection: properties of (a) irreversibility and (b) unlinkability.
sensors results in a stronger dependency on fully operational hardware. Biometric system
can be compromised in a number of ways [7], and leakage of biometric template information
to unauthorized individuals constitutes serious security and privacy threats [6]. For instance,
in case n different comparison scores are combined performing score level fusion, n different
biometric templates have to be stored for each subject registered with the system.
This major drawback of biometric fusion raises the need for multi-biometric template
protection. More precisely, the storage of multiple biometric records of a fused template
of biometric features extracted from different biometric traits has to be protected.
3. Template protection
The industry has long claimed that one of the primary benefits of biometric templates is
that original biometric signals acquired to enroll a data subject cannot be reconstructed from
stored templates. Several techniques (e.g. [8, 11]) have proven this claim wrong. Since
most biometric characteristics are largely immutable, a compromise of raw biometric data
or biometric templates might result in a situation that a subject’s biometric characteristics
are essentially burned and not usable any longer from the security perspective. Biometric
template protection technologies offer significant advantages to enhance the privacy and
security of biometric systems, providing reliable biometric authentication at a high security
level.
3.1. Categorization
Biometric template protection schemes are commonly categorized as (1) biometric
cryptosystems (also referred to as helper data-based schemes) and (2) cancelable biometrics
(also referred to as feature transformation). Biometric cryptosystems are designed to
securely bind a digital key to a biometric or generate a digital key from a biometric [12],
offering solutions to biometric-dependent key-release and biometric template protection
[13, 14]. Cancelable biometrics consist of intentional, repeatable distortions of biometric
signals based on transforms which provide a comparison of biometric templates in the
transformed domain [7]. Both technologies are designed to meet two major requirements
of biometric information protection (ISO/IEC 24745): (1) irreversibility, i.e. it should be
computationally hard to reconstruct the original biometric template from the stored reference
data (protected template), while it should be easy to generate the protected biometric
template; (2) unlinkability, i.e. different versions of protected biometric templates can be
generated based on the same biometric data (renewability), while protected templates should
not allow cross-matching (diversity). Schematic illustrations of both properties are shown in
Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b).
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Advantage Description
Privacy protection Within biometric cryptosystems and cancelable
biometrics the original biometric template is obscured
such that a reconstruction is hardly feasible.
Secure key release Biometric cryptosystems provide key release
mechanisms based on biometrics.
Pseudonymous authentication Authentication is performed in the encrypted domain
and, thus, the biometric reference is a pseudonymous
identifier.
Revocability and renewability of
templates
Several instances of secured templates can be
generated.
Increased security Biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics
prevent from several traditional attacks against
biometric systems.
More social acceptance Biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics
are expected to increase the social acceptance of
biometric applications.
Table 1. Major advantages of technologies of biometric template protection.
3.2. Advantages
Biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics offer several advantages over generic
biometric systems. Most important advantages are summarized in Table 1. These major
advantages over conventional biometric systems call for several applications. In order to
underline the potential of both technologies two essential use cases are discussed in detail.
With respect to the design goals, biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics offer
significant advantages to enhance the privacy and security of biometric systems, providing
reliable biometric authentication at an high security level. Several new issues and challenges
arise deploying these technologies [13].
3.3. Issues
One fundamental challenge, regarding template protection, represents the issue of alignment,
which significantly effects recognition performance. Biometric templates are obscured
within both technologies, i.e. alignment of obscured templates without leakage is highly
non-trivial. For instance, if iris biometric textures or templates (iris-codes) are transformed
in a non-row-wise manner, e.g. block permutation of preprocessed textures or a permutation
of iris-code bits. Consequentially, additional information, which must not lead to template
reconstruction, has to be stored [3].
Focusing on biometric template protection technologies it is not actually clear which
biometric characteristics to apply in which type of application. In fact it has been shown
that even the iris may not exhibit enough reliable information to bind or extract sufficiently
long keys providing acceptable trade-offs between accuracy and security. Stability of
biometric features is required to limit information leakage of stored helper data. In addition,
feature adaptation schemes that preserve accuracy have to be utilized in order to obtain
common representations of arbitrary biometric characteristics (several approaches to extract
fixed-length binary fingerprint templates have been proposed, e.g. [15, 16]).
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Figure 4. Privacy/ accuracy relation: multi-biometrics and template protection systems.
As plenty different approaches to biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics have
been proposed a large number of pseudonyms and acronyms have been dispersed across
literature such that attempts to represented biometric template protection schemes in unified
architectures have been made [17]. Standardization on biometric template protection has
been achieved in the ISO/IEC 24745 standard providing guidance on the protection of an
individual’s privacy during the processing of biometric information.
4. Multi-biometric template protection
As previously mentioned, a lack of security represents a major drawback of multi-biometric
recognition systems [6]. On the other hand, biometric template protection technologies
generally reveal unpractical accuracy compared to underlying recognition algorithms [3].
These facts motivate the incorporation of template protection technologies to multi-biometric
recognition systems, and vice versa.
4.1. Combining the best of two worlds
With respect to the described design goals, i.e. breaking the trade-off between accuracy and
security, multi-biometric template protection systems offer significant advantages, improving
public confidence and acceptance of biometrics. In addition, multi-biometrics provide low
error rates compared to uni-biometric systems even under unconstrained circumstances
paving the way for practical deployment of template protection systems. The relation
between approaches to multi-biometric recognition and biometric template protection is
schematically illustrated in Figure 4, highlighting the potential of multi-biometric template
protection.
4.2. Related work
Focusing on the current state-of-the-art in biometric template protection key approaches to
biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics are summarized in Table 2. Representing
one of the simplest key binding approaches the fuzzy commitment scheme [18] has been
successfully applied to iris [19] (and other biometrics). The fuzzy vault scheme [20] which
represents one of the most popular biometric cryptosystem has frequently been applied
to fingerprints. Early approaches (e.g. [21]), which required a pre-alignment of biometric
templates, have demonstrated the potential of this concept. Several techniques (e.g. [22, 23])
to overcome the shortcoming of pre-alignment have been proposed. Quantization schemes
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Author(s) Applied Technique Modality FRR / FAR (%) Remarks
[19]
Fuzzy Commitment Iris
0.42 / 0.0 small test set
[34] 5.62 / 0.0 short key
[21]
Fuzzy Vault
Fingerprints
20-30 / 0.0
pre-alignment,
>1 enroll sam.
[23] 4.0 / 0.004 >1 enroll sam.
[35] Iris 5.5 / 0.0 –
[36]
Quantization Online Sig.
28.0 / 1.2 >1 enroll sam.
[24] 7.05 / 0.0 short key
[26] Password-Hardening Voice >2.0 / 2.0 short key
[37] BioHashing Face 0.0 / 0.0 non-stolen token
[38]
Block Permutation,
Fingerprints
∼35 / 10−4
–
Surface Folding ∼15 / 10−4
[39] BioConvolving Online Sig. 10.81 EER –
[33] BioHashing Face 0.0002 EER non-stolen token
Table 2. Experimental results of key approaches to biometric template protection schemes.
(e.g. [24, 25]) have been applied to several physiological and behavioral biometrics, while
focusing on reported performance rates, these schemes require further studies in order
to improve accuracy. Besides, approaches which aim at “salting” existing passwords
with biometric features have been proposed [26]. Within the BioHashing approach [27]
biometric features are projected onto secret domains applying user-specific tokens prior to
a key-binding process. Variants of this approach have been exposed to reveal unpractical
performance rates under the stolen-token scenario [28]. With respect to recognition rates,
the vast majority of biometric template protection schemes are by no means comparable to
conventional biometric systems. While numerous approaches to biometric cryptosystems
generate rather short keys at unacceptable performance rates, several enrollment samples
may be required as well, (e.g. four samples in [21]). Approaches which report practical
recognition rates are tested on rather small datasets (e.g. 70 persons in [19]) which must not
be interpreted as significant. In addition, the introduction of additional tokens, be it random
numbers or secret PINs, often clouds the picture of reported results.
First approaches to non-invertible transforms [7] (representing an instance of cancelable
biometrics), which have been applied to face and fingerprints, include block-permutation and
surface-folding. Diverse proposals (e.g. [29, 30]) have shown that recognition performance
decreases noticeably compared to original biometric systems. Additionally, it is doubtable if
sample images of transformed biometric images are non-invertible. BioHashing [27] (without
key-binding) represents the most popular instance of biometric salting yielding a two-factor
authentication scheme. Since additional tokens have to be kept secret (e.g. [31, 32]) result
reporting turns out to be problematic. Perfect recognition rates have been reported (e.g. in
[33]) while the opposite was found to be true [28] within the stolen-token scenario.
Focusing on the incorporation of multiple biometrics in template protection schemes several
approaches have been proposed. Most notable approaches are summarized in Table 3. One of
the first approach to a multi-biometric cryptosystem based on the fuzzy commitment scheme
was proposed by [40], in which binary fingerprint and face features are combined. In [41]
two different feature extraction algorithms are applied to 3D face data yielding a single
Multi-Biometric Template Protection: Issues and Challenges
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/52152
179
Author(s) Applied Technique Modality FRR / FAR (%) Remarks
[40]
Fingerprint
0.92 / >0.001 –
and Face
[41]
Multi-biometric 3D Face
∼ 2.5 EER
single sensor
Fuzzy Commitment and 3D Face scenario
[42]
Iris
5.56 / 0.01
single sensor
and Iris scenario
[43]
Fingerprint
1.8 / 0.01 –
Multi-biometric and Iris
[6]
Fuzzy Vault Fingerprint,
1.0 / 0.0 –
Face and Iris
[44]
Token-based Face
∼ 15.0 EER
single sensor
Scrambling and Face scenario
Table 3. Experimental results of approaches to multi-biometric template protection schemes.
sensor scenario2. The authors provide results for feature level, score level and decision level
fusion. In order to obtain a comparison score the number of errors corrected by the error
correction code are estimated, i.e. scores are only available in case of successful decoding.
Best results are obtained for the multi-algorithm fusion at feature level. [42] propose a
sensible rearrangement of bits in iris codes in order to provide a uniform distribution of
error probabilities. The rearrangement allows a more efficient execution of error correction
codes combining the most reliable bits generated by different feature extraction algorithms.
[43] proposed a multi-biometric cryptosystem fuzzy vault based on fingerprint and iris.
The authors demonstrate that a combination of biometric modalities leads to increased
accuracy and, thus, higher security. A FRR of 1.8% at a FAR of ∼0.01% is obtained, while
the corresponding FRR values of the iris and fingerprint fuzzy vaults are 12% and 21.2%,
respectively. [44] combine two different feature extraction methods to achieve cancelable face
biometrics. PCA and ICA (independent component analysis) coefficients are extracted and
both feature vectors are randomly scrambled and added in order to create a transformed
template. In rather recent work [6] report results on multi-biometric fuzzy commitment
schemes and fuzzy vault schemes based on fingerprint, face and iris. In order to obtain
a common feature representation for each type of template protection scheme the authors
propose different embedding algorithms, e.g. for mapping a binary string to a point set. best
results are obtained for a multi-biometric fuzzy vault scheme. Compared to feature level
fusion and score level fusion, recently [45] proposed a multi-biometric template protection
system employing decision level fusion of multiple protected fingerprint templates.
Several other ideas of using a set of multiple biometric characteristics within biometric
template protections schemes have been proposed [46–51].
2 Note that in general single sensor scenarios are more challenging than those based on multiple sensors, since, in case
of noise occurrence, each feature extractor has to deal with signal degradation.
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Figure 5. A framework of a generic multi-biometric template protection at feature level.
That is, a rearrangement of biometric feature vectors in order to provide a uniform
distribution of errors improves the overall accuracy of the system.
5. Issues and challenges
Besides already mentioned issues of multi-biometric recognition (see Chapter 2.3) and
template protection technologies (see Chapter 3.3), which may be solved through
multi-biometric template protection, several further issues might occur which have to be
dealt with. From designing a generic framework for multi-biometric template protection at
a coarse level different evolving issues will be discussed in detail.
5.1. Generic framework for multi-biometric template protection
The major goal of research in the area of multi-biometric template protection is to generate
a generic framework of constructing multi-biometric template protection schemes, i.e. a code
of practice according to various aspects for incorporating different biometric templates in
one or more template protection system(s), yielding multi-biometric template protection.
From existing research it appears that biometric fusion on feature level is most suitable
for template protection schemes [6, 40–42]. While preliminary scores are not available
within the vast majority of biometric cryptosystems, cancelable biometric systems based on
score level fusion can be constructed analogue to conventional biometric systems. For both
technologies biometric fusion based on decision level can easily be implemented combining
final decisions. Figure 5 shows a schematic impression of how such a framework (based on
feature level fusion) could look like.
In order to provide generic multi-biometric template protection the system should be capable
of incorporating n different biometric templates, which need not exhibit a common feature
representation, i.e. k different representation may be involved. In a fusion module a common
representation of feature vectors is established and feature vectors are combined in a sensible
manner. Subsequently, an adequate template protection scheme is applied to protect the
multi-biometric template. Focusing on a generic fusion of multiple biometric templates in a
template protection system several issues evolve.
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Figure 6. Template alignment within a multi-biometric template protection scheme.
5.2. Template alignment
Focusing on distinct biometric characteristics, e.g. iris, alignment within a template
protection scheme can still be feasible. For instance, within an iris biometric fuzzy
commitment scheme template alignment can be achieved by applying decommitments
at various shifting positions. Within conventional biometric systems align-invariant
approaches have been proposed for several biometric characteristics. So far, hardly
any suggestions have been made to construct align-invariant biometric cryptosystems or
cancelable biometrics. Still, focusing on technologies of biometric template protection, feature
alignment significantly effects recognition performance. Biometric templates are obscured
within template protection systems, i.e. alignment of protected templates is highly non-trivial
[52]. Feature level fusion of biometric templates potentially aggravates a proper alignment
of protected templates (optimal alignments vary for incorporated templates), while auxiliary
data for the use of alignment may leak information on stored templates. More precisely, a
combined feature vector may consist of t chunks of feature elements generated by t diverse
feature extractors. In order to establish a proper alignment of the entire feature vector, chunks
of feature elements need to be aligned individually. In general a common optimal alignment
which is valid for all chunks of feature elements is rather unlikely. Hence, additional helper
data is required which at least has to mark start and end points of such chunks. Figure 6
provides an schematic illustration of this issue.
As previously mentioned an adaption of biometric feature vectors to template protection
schemes is considered inevitable in order to achieve practical recognition rates. However,
generally a rearrangement of features within biometric templates makes conventional
template alignment infeasible. Again, in order to align protected templates properly,
additional helper data (e.g. reverse permutations) need to be stored (cf. [22, 23]), in a global
or subject-specific manner. The additional storage of helper data is essential but will cause
information leakage, i.e. potential impostors may utilize the additional helper data in order
to compromise or cross-match protected templates, in case of subject-specific helper data.
5.3. Combination of modalities
In fact it has been shown that distinct biometric modalities (e.g. fingerprint or iris) exhibit
enough reliable information to bind or extract sufficiently long keys providing acceptable
trade-offs between accuracy and security, where the best performing schemes are based on
fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault. However, practical error correction codes are designed
for communication and data storage purposes such that a perfect error correction code for
a desired code length has remained evasive (optimal codes exist only theoretically under
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certain assumptions [53]). The fact that false rejection rates are lower bounded by error
correction capacities [54] emerges a great challenge since unbounded use of error correction
(if applicable) makes the system even more vulnerable [55]. Other characteristics such as
voice or keystroke dynamics (especially behavioral characteristics) were found to reveal only
a small amount of stable information [26], but can still be applied to improve the security of
an existing secret. While for some characteristics extracting of a sufficient amount of reliable
features seems to be feasible it still remains questionable if these features exhibit enough
entropy. In case extracted features do not meet requirements of discriminativity, systems
become vulnerable to several attacks (e.g. false acceptance attacks). In addition, stability of
biometric features is required to limit information leakage of stored helper data as well as
a sufficient secret length. Focusing on multi-biometric template protection schemes which
perform biometric fusion at feature level a single sensor fusion scenario could be applied
in order to overcome the issue of alignment. Any combination of biometric feature vectors
extracted from a single biometric signal alleviates the construction of a multi-biometric
template protection scheme, in case these feature extractors apply the same mode of
operation when analyzing biometric data. For instance, if two different iris biometric feature
extractors extract binary iris-codes from pre-processed textures and operate on same block
sizes extracting the same number of bits per block, a single optimal alignment for both
extracted feature vectors exists.
Due to the sensitivity of template protection schemes multiple enrollment samples are
required and thus, compared to conventional biometric systems, more user-cooperation
(compared to conventional biometric systems) is demanded in order to decrease intra-class
variation, while sensoring and preprocessing require improvement as well. Furthermore,
from the usability side of view it has to be analyzed which combinations of biometric
modalities are applicable (e.g. iris and face or fingerprint and hand geometry) [2]. In order to
keep the multi-biometric system usable only those modalities should be combined that allow
acquisition of multiple samples with “one” single capture device (e.g. capturing two iris
images and one face image with multiple cameras that are integrated in one capture device).
Only then the capture time and consequently the transaction time will remain constant.
5.4. Feature representation
While different template protection systems incorporating multiple biometric traits have
been proposed, these turn out to be custom-built according to applied biometric feature
representations and applied template protection schemes. Multi-biometric template
protection schemes in literature have been proposed for numerous types of template
protection requiring different feature representations (a detailed overview can be found in
[3]). While some techniques have been applied to distinct template protection systems (e.g.
fuzzy commitment scheme or fuzzy vault scheme) a detailed analysis of pros and cons of
these schemes regarding the application of multi-biometrics has remained elusive. Such
investigation involves factors such as scalability, i.e. the vast majority of template protection
schemes require fixed-length feature vectors and are only scalable in discrete iterations
(e.g. by adding a distinct number of chunks of error correction codewords). Biometric
template protection schemes are designed for a distinct representation of feature vectors,
e.g. fuzzy commitment schemes require binary biometric templates as input while fuzzy
vault schemes require real-valued biometric templates. A fusion of binary iris-codes and
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minutiae triples can still be performed without a successive application of different types
of template protection schemes (e.g. in [43]). However, as this is not the case in general,
embedding functions are required in order to perform mappings between different feature
representations; such mappings must not cause a drastic loss of information.
Since different template protection schemes require distinct feature representations a generic
framework for multi-biometric template protection should be able to handle diverse inputs
of feature vectors. This issue can be solve in two ways:
1. Unified representation: by establishing a common representation of biometric features (e.g.
by quantizing feature vectors [24]) or
2. Different template protection schemes: by combining different types of template protection
schemes according to the provided feature vectors (e.g. fuzzy commitment scheme and
fuzzy vault scheme [43]).
It is expected that the first opportunity degrades discriminativity of feature vectors while
the second is expected to cause security vulnerabilities of protected templates. In order to
prevent impostors from attacking separately stored protected templates biometric fusion can
be performed at “secret level”, i.e. each applied template protection scheme contributed a
chunk of bits while the final secret is constructed from calculating a hash of the concatenation
of all bit chunks. Still, representation of feature vectors represents one of the most critical
issues.
5.5. System security
Focusing on the possible levels of fusion existing approaches to feature-level fusion in
template protection systems merely involve a trivial concatenation of biometric templates
(e.g. [40, 41]). It has been demonstrated, to some extent, that a more-sophisticated
feature-level fusion leads to improved accuracy as well as template security [42]. However,
more detailed analysis of adapting multiple biometric templates (based on different
feature representations) to according template protection schemes on feature level is
demanded. While approaches to cancelable biometrics provide a comparison score for each
authentication attempt (offering trivial score-level fusion), within biometric cryptosystems
subjects are authenticated indirectly via key validities, i.e. comparison scores are not
explicitly available. For instance, in [41] comparison scores are equalized with required
error correction capacities, however, more sophisticated approaches to multi-biometric
cryptosystems based on score level fusion are non-existent. Biometric fusion at decision
level implies the incorporation of a significant amount of biometric templates (e.g. to
enable majority voting) in a template protection system. For both technologies, biometric
cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics, biometric fusion on decision level can be
implemented straight-forward. With respect to biometric cryptosystems a way of performing
biometric fusion on secret level could be implemented by a (bit-wise) majority vote of
released keys. Even tough approaches to cancelable biometric may easily be fused at
decision level, recognition performance does not necessarily correlate with results reported
for traditional multi-biometric systems. However, by definition, this level of fusion is
restricting the system to a separate protection of multiple templates, which need to be
secured individually, and can cause further security risks [6].
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In the vast majority of approaches to biometric template protection schemes provided
security is put on a level with obtained recognition performance, i.e. obtained FAR at a
targeted FRR. While analysis with respect to irreversibility and unlinkability is rarely done,
some quantities to measure the security of template protection systems have been suggested,
e.g. key entropy [56], maximum key size [57], or information leakage of stored helper data
[58, 59]. These analysis need to be adapted and extended in order to establish a generic
methodology of measuring the security of multi-biometric template protection systems.
Focusing on security/ privacy of template protection schemes several magnitudes have been
proposed for uni-biometric template protection schemes (e.g. [56, 58]). With respect to
multi-biometric template protection schemes security measures need to be reformulated and
extended since additional factors, such as a separate storage of protected templates, take
influence on the security provided by the system [6]. We plan to establish a generic modus
operandi of estimating the security of any multi-biometric template protection scheme in
an information theoretic way. Emphasis will also be put on irreversibility and unlinkability
analysis, which is rarely done in existing literature (e.g. in [39]).
6. Summary
The presented bookchapter provides an overview of multi-biometric template protection.
While both technologies, multi-biometric recognition [2] and biometric template protection
[3], suffer from serious drawbacks a sensible combination of these could eliminate individual
disadvantages. Different template protection systems incorporating multiple biometric
traits, which have been proposed in literature, are summarized. While, at first glance,
multi-biometric template protection seems to solve several drawbacks, diverse issues arise.
Based on a theoretical framework for multi-biometric template protection several issues,
e.g. template alignment at feature level, are elaborated and discussed in detail. While
generic approaches to the construction of multi-biometric template protection schemes have
remained elusive we provide several suggestions for designing multi-biometric template
protection systems.
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